The Effect of Age upon CEO Compensation: A Cross-Industry Study by Bouvier, Anthony
Claremont Colleges
Scholarship @ Claremont
CMC Senior Theses CMC Student Scholarship
2010
The Effect of Age upon CEO Compensation: A
Cross-Industry Study
Anthony Bouvier
Claremont McKenna College
This Open Access Senior Thesis is brought to you by Scholarship@Claremont. It has been accepted for inclusion in this collection by an authorized
administrator. For more information, please contact scholarship@cuc.claremont.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bouvier, Anthony, "The Effect of Age upon CEO Compensation: A Cross-Industry Study" (2010). CMC Senior Theses. Paper 11.
http://scholarship.claremont.edu/cmc_theses/11
CLAREMONT McKENNA COLLEGE 
THE EFFECT OF AGE UPON CEO COMPENSATION:  
A CROSS-INDUSTRY STUDY 
 
 
 
 
 
 
SUBMITTED TO 
PROFESSOR HENRIK CRONQVIST 
AND 
DEAN GREGORY HESS 
BY 
ANTHONY BOUVIER 
 
 
 
 
FOR 
SENIOR THESIS 
FALL/2010 
November 29, 2010  
2 
 
  
3 
 
Table of Contents 
I. Introduction……………………………………………………………………………4 
II. Literature Review……………………………………………………………………...4 
III. Data and Methodology…………………………………………………………...……6 
IV. Results and Discussion………………………………………………………………12 
V. Conclusion....……...………………………………………………………….…...…17 
VI. Appendix......................................................................................................................18 
VII. Acknowledgements…………………………………………………………………..24 
VIII. References……………………………………………………………………………24 
  
4 
 
I. Introduction 
The compensation of CEO’s has been at the forefront of the public’s mind for the past 
few years.  During the recession, one could not go a day without hearing about the atrocious 
salaries and bonuses that executives were being paid.  Although it only recently became an 
explosive topic, academics have been researching all aspects of compensation for many years.  
One of the earliest looked at the idea of pay for performance (Jensen and Murphy 1990), and the 
field has taken off from there. Many studies have been done on the determinants of 
compensation, and I was interested in how age relates to compensation.  I created a model for 
determining compensation, but also took it one step further and looked at the compensation 
structure across different industries as well.  I found that age did indeed influence compensation 
levels, but that it only had some effect on pay structure and only in certain industries.  
 
II. Literature Review 
There are many angles that have been taken to analyze CEO compensation.  For example, 
(Milbourn 2003) investigated whether a CEO’s reputation affected their stock-based 
compensation.  Hill and Phan (1991) argued that CEO tenure is a major factor in determining 
compensation.  They hypothesized that the influence of CEOs over their board of directors and 
the likelihood their compensation packages matched their personal preferences would increased 
the longer the incumbent had tenure (Hill and Phan 1991).  Similarly, Davidson et al. (2006) 
examine the determinant of CEO age at a succession.  They found that board members are more 
likely to choose a new CEO that is closer to their own age. Interestingly enough, they also found 
that this bias did not negatively impact performance, but instead improved it somewhat 
(Davidson, Nemec, and Worrell 2006). 
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The main theme in these studies is the fact that there is definitely a non-financial 
component of some kind on the determinants of CEO compensation.  One of the most important 
human determinants is age (McKnight et al. 2000).  McKnight et al. argue that the size of the 
company, shareholder return, and CEO turnover are not sufficient enough variables to explain 
the differences in CEO compensation by themselves, which is where the addition of the age 
variable can pick up the slack.  They believe that there is a personal attribution aspect to it as 
well, for which age can be a proxy.  Their findings supported their hypotheses that the 
compensation level of CEO’s would be positively related to age, but there were diminishing 
returns on pay increases as age increased.  This effect was so profound, that the compensation 
level started to decrease as an incumbent approached retirement age.   
Another interesting factor related to age is the idea of a career horizon (Davidson et al. 
2007).  It has been shown that the tenure of an executive can be broken down into five distinct 
periods or “seasons” (Hambrick and Fukutomi 1991).  An executive has different goals and 
motivations at different points in his career, and the length of his career horizon until he retires 
can affect the decisions that are made.  Davidson et al. use this to explain why it would be 
advantageous for an executive to inflate earnings in the year or two prior to a succession.  They 
argue that the executives are incentivized to do this because their pay packages are too heavily 
based on performance.  Because they are about to retire, they can benefit from the upside of 
inflating earnings without having to experience the repercussions of their actions a few years 
down the road. 
I will differ from these studies because I will create a more complete model for 
determining compensation, incorporating the different aspects discussed by the literature that I 
mentioned.  I will also look at pay structure across industries to determine whether there are 
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fundamental differences.  Then, I will see if the pay structure for executives in different 
industries changes with age. 
My hypotheses are as follows: 
1) Age will be a statistically significant determinant of all components of compensation. 
2) In mature industries where products and services are difficult to differentiate from the 
competition’s, the compensation structure will be weighted more towards guaranteed 
compensation (salary) than to variable pay.  Furthermore, in these industries, the 
percentage of fixed compensation will decrease with age. 
 
III. Data and Methodology 
Data Sources 
 Data were gathered from Standard & Poor’s Compustat database, through Wharton Data 
Research Services (WRDS). The main cross-sectional sample of 2009 CEOs was compiled from 
the Annual Executive Compensation subset of Compustat, which provided all of the data on the 
individual incumbent CEOs and their companies, as well as their compensation.  Data on 
individual firms’ market capitalizations was also provided by Compustat, in the Annual 
Fundamentals subset.  The analysis was done on data from 2009 because it is the most recent 
complete fiscal year, and it is far enough removed from the recession that compensation has 
returned to some sense of normalcy.  Also, there have been no papers on this subject after the 
recession, so my data will be unique in that respect.  The raw data had about 1800 observations, 
but some were missing data, so after cleaning it up, I was left with a little over 1600 
observations.  My analyses will be very statistically accurate because I have a sufficiently large 
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enough sample to get a representative cross section of the universe of publicly traded companies 
in the United States. 
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CEO Compensation Measures 
Multiple regression analyses were used with the different components of compensation as 
the dependent or y-variables and different measures proven in the literature as explanatory or x-
variables.  The components of executive compensation were broken down into 4 parts:  Base 
salary, Short-Term Incentives, Long-Term Incentives, and Total Direct Compensation.  Base 
salary is straight forward and the most consistent of all of the variables because the vast majority 
of CEOs (and everyone below them for that matter) receive a base salary  
Short-Term Incentives (STI) are the non-salary cash portion of compensation.  This is 
more colloquially known as a “bonus”, but I wanted to be more specific because there are 
multiple types of payouts that can be considered as bonuses.  The first is the traditional 
performance “bonus” which is tied to some type of financial or operating metric.  The other type 
of “bonus” is called a discretionary bonus.  These payments are not tied to any performance 
metric, rather the Compensation Committees can choose to award cash at their discretion to 
executives at the end of the year. The purpose of the discretionary bonus is to give the 
Compensation Committee the ability to incentivize the executives if they are not eligible for a 
performance bonus because of circumstances beyond their control (i.e. a recession). Therefore, I 
have defined STI as the sum of the performance bonus and any discretionary bonus paid in a 
given year. 
Long-Term Incentives (LTI) are the non-cash portions of compensation, and can be 
broken down into stock option and restricted stock grants.  Restricted Stock or Restricted Stock 
Units (RSUs) are converted into common shares once they have vested, giving full value to the 
recipient.  Options, on the other hand, have vesting schedules like RSUs, but they are different 
because upon vesting, the recipient has the right to purchase stock at a specified price, called the 
10 
 
strike or exercise price.  Generally, the strike price is the closing price of the company’s stock on 
the date of grant, so the value in options is only the difference between the selling price and the 
exercise price.  Black-Scholes is the most prominent option valuation method used in industry, 
but I used the FAS 123 method because the data was more complete.  Therefore, I defined my 
LTI variable as the sum of the FAS 123 valuations of stock options and RSUs granted to 
executives in 2009. 
The last component of composition is Total Direct Compensation (TDC), which is the 
sum of the previous three components.  This represents all of the compensation directly granted 
to CEOs during the year.  There are other indirect forms of compensation such as benefits and 
perquisites, and although it can be argued that these provide incentives as well, the total dollar 
value of these perks is miniscule compared to the TDC, so I did not include them in the analyses.  
Also, the benefits and perks were grouped together in the data in a column called “All Other 
Compensation”, which made it impossible to tell what exactly was included in that number.  
There was no way of knowing the breakdown of what perks were received and the dollar amount 
for each, which would have been the most interesting topic to analyze. 
I ran separate regressions with each of these compensation components as the dependent 
variable, and the same general set of explanatory variables.  The main variables supported in the 
literature are age, size of company, tenure, and industry controls.  The age of CEOs in 2009 is 
straight forward, and I also created a quadratic age term because it fit some of the data more 
accurately than the linear variable on its own.  Market capitalization was used as a proxy for the 
size of the company, and was calculated by multiplying the common shares outstanding by the 
closing share price on December 31, 2009.  Tenure was the length of time that the CEO had been 
in his current role, rounded to the nearest year.  The industry controls were dummy variables for 
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each of the ten economic sectors based on the first two digits of the GIC code assigned to the 
firm.  I also included the number of shares owned overall by the each CEO because it could add 
more explanatory power to shifts in compensation. 
Compensation Structure 
After I performed a cross-sectional analysis of the pay levels of the entire US market, 
controlling for industry fixed effects, I analyzed the pay mix across these industries.  I created 
new variables that were the percentage each component (base, STI, and LTI) made up of Total 
Direct Compensation.  Then, I plotted these percentages against age to see how the pay mix 
differs for as age changes.  I started with the entire data set, which was inconclusive, and then 
broke it down into the ten economic sectors specified by the first two numbers of a company’s 
GIC code.  Some sectors were still too broad, so I went one step further, breaking the sectors into 
industry groups which were derived by using the next two numbers from the GIC code as well.  
This resulted in a total of 25 industry groups, each with graphs for all three components versus 
age.   
I focused on the percentage of base salary because it represents the guaranteed portion of 
an executive’s compensation.  I created summary statistics for the base salary percentage of 
every industry, using the mean and median base salary to compare them.  Finally, I analyzed the 
change in base salary percentage versus age, determining which industries were positively and 
negatively correlated as well as showed the largest and smallest changes. 
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IV. Results 
 Age Model 
The first test that was run regressed base salary on the independent variables (Table 1). 
Consistent with the literature, it was found that age is statistically significant with a positive 
coefficient, and the age-squared term is also significant at the 1% level, but with a negative 
coefficient.  More specifically, it was found that for every one year increase in age, base salary 
would increase by about $40,500, but would incur diminishing returns at a rate of $-310 per year 
increase in age-squared.  This quadratic fit is represented in Figure 1, where base salary increases 
with age with diminishing returns until around age 65, where the negative quadratic term 
becomes greater than the linear age term and salary begins to decrease.  Market capitalization 
was extremely significant in every regression that was run, which emphasizes the intuitive fact 
that it is the main determinant of the level of CEO compensation.  For every $1 billion increase 
in market capitalization, base salary increased by $5,480.  However, tenure became insignificant 
once the industry controls were added, suggesting age is sufficient enough to describe the 
variation in base salary.   Also, for every 1 million shares of company stock owned, base salary 
decreased by $1,840, which was significant at the 1% level.  This is makes sense because the 
more stock the CEO has received as compensation, the lesser the fraction that base salary makes 
up of overall pay.  Therefore, at a certain point, increasing base salary does not serve to 
incentivize the CEO as efficiently as other forms of pay.  The R
2
 for this first regression was 
0.193, meaning about 20% of the variation in base salary can be explained by my model.  This 
shows that my model is decent at determining base salary because there are so many other 
concrete and intangible variables related to each company and CEO that I was not able to 
include. 
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When the same regression was run on Short-Term Incentives as the dependent variable, a 
linear age model was the best fit.  Age was again significant at the 1% level, and it was found 
that for every 1 year increase in age, short-term incentives increased by $20,804.  Firm size had 
more of an effect on STI than on base salary.  For every $1 billion increase in market 
capitalization, the value of STI granted increased by $23,100.  Tenure was originally significant, 
but fell out of importance when the industry controls were added.  The total shares owned 
variable was again negative, showing a decrease in STI $5,590 for every 1 million increase in 
shares, but it was only significant at the 10% level.  The R
2
 for this regression dropped, so only 
12.5% of the variation in short-term incentives was explained by the model.  One of the possible 
reasons for the drop was the fact that many of the CEOs did not receive a bonus in 2009.  This 
skewed the regression results downward, so age, firm size, and shares owned would have an 
increased effect on STI if the zeros were taken out.  I chose to run my analysis with the zeros still 
included because it accurately reflects instances where an executive does not receive a bonus (for 
whatever reason).  The problem is that the number of CEOs who did not receive STI is probably 
still elevated from the lingering effects of the recession.  Also, the predictions of a continued 
slowed economic recovery could have kept these levels depressed below what they would 
normally be, even though we are not officially in the recession anymore. 
Long-Term Incentives behaved very differently than either base salary or STI.  Age was 
not significant in predicting the levels of LTI at any level, but instead, tenure was significant at 
the 1%  level.  The interesting thing was that tenure had a negative effect on LTI: for every 1 
year increase in CEO tenure, the value of long-term incentives granted decreased by $32,911.  
Both firm size and total shares owned were also significant at the 1% level as well.  For every $1 
billion increase in market capitalization, LTI increased by $55,300, and for a 1 million increase 
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in shares owned, LTI decreased by $21,000.  Intriguingly enough, the R
2
 for this model was 
between the values of STI and base salary, explaining 14.7% of the variation in long-term 
incentives.  One of the reasons why age is not a good determinant of long term incentives might 
be the fact that there are so many different ways to incentivize CEOs with equity.  The vast 
differences between options and restricted stock, both in how they are valued and how they are 
granted could contribute to inconsistent data.  Since I was methodologically sound in the way I 
compiled the data, even if there is some inconsistencies, it was found that age is not a good 
predictor of long-term incentives. 
When we take a step back and consider the level of overall pay, Total Direct 
Compensation behaved very similar to short-term incentives.  Age was again significant, but at 
the 5% level this time, and for every 1 year increase in age, total compensation increased by 
$37,064.  Interestingly enough, firm size, tenure, and total shares owned were all statistically 
significant at the 1% level.  Firm size had the largest effect, increasing TDC by $83,800 for 
every $1 billion increase in market capitalization.  Tenure was next, decreasing TDC by $44,138 
for every additional year that the CEO retains his job.  Finally, for every 1 million increase in 
total shares owned, TDC decreased by $28,300.  This is the only regression where all three of 
these independent variables were significant, which accounts for the increase in the R
2
 to 0.187.  
It makes sense that age and all of the other independent variables significantly affect the level of 
total direct compensation because the variation in how the pay mix is broken down is taken out 
of the equation.  We are just analyzing the overall pay level that each CEO receives, so the data 
should have been much more accurate than each of the components individually.  Like base 
salary, there were no zeros to skew the results, so although there is still room for improvement, 
my model explains variations in TDC fairly well. 
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Industry Comparisons 
 Fixed Compensation Percentage 
I found that there was some variation between industries in both the percentage of fixed 
compensation and how it changed with age.  First, I looked at the median percentage of base 
salary to test the first part of my hypothesis (Table 2).  The findings were inconclusive as to 
whether or not I was correct in postulating that mature industries where product differentiation is 
difficult had a higher percentage of fixed compensation.  
Banks had the highest median, and at about 59%, it was almost double the median base 
salary percentage of the closest industry.  This is intuitive because there are so many banks of all 
sizes who offer very similar services.  The main differentiator between the major banks today is 
the threat of bankruptcy, so it makes sense that the compensation structure is more heavily 
weighted toward riskless pay so there is not as much incentive for executives to undertake risk 
for their firms.  Next in line are the automobile and equipment industries, with medians of 30.5% 
and 28.2% respectively.   These industries are similar because they are both consolidated and 
extremely correlated with the state of the economy.  But, product and service differentiation is 
difficult for both industries, which supports my hypothesis.  On the other hand, the consumer 
goods industry, which includes agricultural products, packaged foods and drinks, brewers and 
distillers, and tobacco, had the lowest median at only 16%.  These are all well-established 
segments where there is a lot of competition, but in this case, compensation was geared towards 
a much more risky structure.  These executives are being incentivized to differentiate their firms 
from the competition, even though it is very tough to do so in these industries.  This casts doubt 
on my hypothesis because a mature industry has a very low median base salary percentage. 
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The second and third from the bottom are the Energy and Telecom industries, which have 
medians of 16.6% and 17.4% respectively.  The energy industry is mostly made up of oil and gas 
companies, which have very high risks associated with them.  There are such high costs for 
exploration of new oil sites and the operation of existing wells that firms need their executives to 
be constantly pushing the limits to stay ahead of the competition.  The same goes for the 
Telecom industry because technology is an ever evolving beast, and if these companies are not 
on the cutting edge, they will not survive.  These two industries support my hypothesis because 
the firms need their executives to take big risks to stay ahead of their competitors.  However, my 
hypothesis is again thrown into question by the Electronic Hardware industry.  It has the fourth 
highest median base salary percentage, at 27.4%, but it is made up of companies who 
manufacture computer and electrical components, which require a lot of research and 
development to stay on the same playing field as their competition. 
Overall, it was difficult to conclude whether there was a definite trend in the median 
percentage of fixed compensation.  Many of these industries are still very broad, and it could be 
that I would have to continue breaking them into their individual sub-industries in order to obtain 
conclusive results.  It does seem, however, that manufacturing companies tended to have a 
higher median base salary percentage, which could suggest that any type of manufacturing 
requires less risk taken by the CEO. 
 
 Comparison with Age 
My hypothesis also stated that for industries where there is a higher median percentage of 
fixed income, the percentage would decrease with age.  I also found that this was inconclusive, 
but was most likely incorrect because the industries with the highest median percentage tended to 
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increase with age.  Of the five highest median base salary percentages, Banks, Commercial 
Services, and Electronic Hardware were positively correlated with age, and Equipment and 
Construction and Automotive were negative, but only weakly correlated.  Interestingly, the 
bottom also followed a similar pattern, with three that were positively correlated with age 
(Figures 1-5).  Most of the industries had base salary percentage only weakly correlated with 
age, but a couple of them were fairly strongly correlated.  The Aerospace and Defense, 
Transportation, and Insurance industries all showed a little over a 1% increase in the percentage 
of base salary for every year increase in age (Figures 6-8).  This means that as CEOs get older 
and more experienced, the amount of risk in their compensation decreases substantially in these 
industries.  This could be because these industries value experience, and include this 1% “age 
premium” to secure their executives for the long-term.  However, the findings were not very 
significant, so there is no conclusive evidence that this phenomenon exists. 
 
V. Conclusion 
My compensation model confirmed my first hypothesis that age is a significant factor for 
base salary, short-term incentives, and total direct compensation, but not for long-term 
incentives.  This confirmed the literature and allowed for the investigation of age with regards to 
pay structure.  My second hypothesis was not confirmed because there was much variation in the 
structure of compensation across similar industries.  Also, age does not seem to determine 
changes in CEO pay structure except for in certain industries.  This might be the reason that there 
was no literature that has examined this topic, but there should be some other variations on my 
analysis that could prove insightful.   For example, further analysis could be also done to 
determine the causes of the change of structure with age in the relevant industries.   
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VI. Appendix 
 
Table 1: Age Model 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
VARIABLES Base STI LTI TDC 
          
Age 40,479*** 20,804*** 9,813 37,064** 
 
(11,063) (6,389) (12,616) (16,664) 
Age2 -310.2*** 
   
 
(97.73) 
   
Market Cap 5.48e-06*** 2.31e-05*** 5.53e-05*** 8.38e-05*** 
 
(3.86e-07) (1.94e-06) (3.84e-06) (5.07e-06) 
Tenure 
 
-9,181 1.017e+06** -44,138*** 
  
(6,444) (503,408) (16,807) 
Total Shares Owned -0.00184*** -0.00559* -0.0210*** -0.0283*** 
 
(0.000585) (0.00299) (0.00591) (0.00780) 
Industry Controls X X X X 
 
Constant -460,796 -18,422 1.852e+06** 2.312e+06** 
 
(316,355) (390,512) (771,124) (1.019e+06) 
     Observations 1,673 1,673 1,673 1,673 
R-squared 0.193 0.125 0.147 0.187 
Standard errors in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 2: Base Salary as a Percentage of Total Direct Compensation 
Industry 
Number of 
Observations 
Base 
Mean 
Base 
Median 
Age 
Median 
Age 
Minimum 
Age 
Maximum 
       Banking 88 57.3% 58.5% 56 36 78 
Automotive 17 32.1% 30.5% 58 52 69 
Equipment 124 32.0% 28.2% 56 38 70 
Commercial Services 51 33.7% 28.1% 54 42 67 
Electronic Hardware 115 37.0% 27.4% 54 39 73 
Entertainment 38 41.3% 26.3% 57.5 43 79 
Hospitality 70 30.9% 25.8% 53 42 76 
Retail 104 33.5% 25.3% 53 42 76 
Materials 99 31.7% 24.5% 57 43 80 
Appliances 72 35.5% 23.5% 54 33 74 
Insurance 62 29.6% 23.2% 56.5 39 78 
Utilities 76 24.3% 23.2% 56 46 67 
Transportation 34 30.0% 23.0% 57 47 73 
Semiconductors 75 29.1% 22.8% 54 40 72 
Food & Drug 19 30.1% 22.7% 57 45 73 
REITs 65 30.1% 22.5% 53 39 80 
Life Sci, BioTech, Pharma 57 28.7% 21.6% 55 42 82 
Healthcare 124 28.6% 21.6% 54 39 75 
I-Banking & Finance 49 29.3% 21.1% 53 39 66 
Software 123 28.2% 21.1% 53 38 73 
Household Products 14 29.6% 19.7% 55 31 68 
Aerospace & Defense 27 27.9% 18.8% 59 50 93 
Telecom 24 18.7% 17.4% 53.5 44 71 
Energy 89 22.0% 16.6% 56 41 79 
Consumer Goods 49 21.7% 16.0% 55 45 71 
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Figure 3 
 
Figure 4 
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Figure 5 
 
Figure 6 
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Figure 8 
 
y = 0.0114x - 0.3198
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